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STRATEGIC EFFECTS OF AIRLINE ALLIANCES 
 





  This paper looks at the endogenous formation of airline alliances by 
means of a two-stage game where first airlines decide whether to form an 
alliance and then fares are determined. We analyze the profitability and the 
strategic effects of airline alliances when two complementary alliances, 
following different paths, may be formed to serve a certain city-pair market. 
The formation of a complementary alliance is shown to hurt outsiders and that 
fares decrease in the interline market. Contrary to what might be expected, we 
find that complementary alliances are not always profitable, even in the 
presence of economies of traffic density. The interplay between market size, the 
degree of product differentiation and the intensity of economies of traffic 
density determines whether the market equilibrium entails no alliances, a single 
alliance or a double alliance. 
 
JEL classification: L13, L2, L93. 
Keywords:  complementary airline alliances, economies of traffic density, product 
differentiation. 
 1 Introduction
The air transportation sector has witnessed a number of changes since the deregu-
lation processes of the US industry (in the 1980s) and of the European industry (in
the 1990s). These changes include the substantial decline in the number of major
carriers, the intensiﬁed reorganization of routes into hub-and-spoke networks and,
still taking place, the formation of strategic alliances among international carriers.1
In particular, a formal explanation to the rise of international airline alliances seems
to be lacking. The present paper identiﬁes conditions under which airline alliances
are strategically advantageous, examines the eﬀects on carriers outside the alliance
and studies how travel volumes and fares are aﬀected.
Airline alliances are designed to oﬀer passengers a seamless service in order to
minimize some of the inconveniences of interline multi-carrier trips. They allow the
carriers to rely on a partner to provide ﬂight to destinations where they lack route
authority. Cooperation adopts several forms - which in many instances come close
to eﬀective merger - and includes codesharing agreements, the coordination of ﬂight
schedules and the joint use of frequent ﬂyer programs. Collaboration between airlines
can be traced as far back as the 1940s when, for instance, Air France was involved
in setting up the operations of many African airlines, such as Air Afrique, Royal Air
Maroc and Tunisair. The ﬁrst major multi-partner alliance was that between Delta
Air Lines, Singapore Airlines and Swissair in the early 1990s. At present, almost
every major airline belongs to a big international alliance: Oneworld, Star Alliance,
and The Sky Team.2 The structure of the industry is constantly changing as with the
recent merger (September 2004) between Air France and KLM, and the announced
agreement to merge between America West Airlines and US Airways (May 2005).
Since the major alliances enjoy antitrust immunity, another advantage of an al-
liance is related with cooperative pricing in interline trips. It seems that IATA’s
1See Morrison and Winston (1995) for an overview of developments in the industry.
2The Oneworld Alliance includes British Airways, American Airlines, Iberia, Lan Chile, Aer
Lingus, Qantas, Cathay Paciﬁc and Finnair among others. The most important airlines in the
Star Alliance are Lufthansa, United Airlines, US Airways, Air Canada, All Nippon Airways,
Thai Airways, Singapore Airlines, Air New Zealand, Varig Brasil, SAS, the Austrian Group and
British Midland. Finally, The Sky Team is mainly composed of Air France, Delta Air Lines, KLM,
Northwest, Continental Airlines, Alitalia, Korean Air, CSA and Malaysian Air System.
3(International Air Transport Association) inﬂuence over negotiations on interline
fares has declined and there is evidence that, after the deregulation processes both
in the US and in Europe, airline cooperation has pushed fares down whereas travel
volumes have increased.3 In a sense, this is what theory would predict since joint
pricing of complementary ﬂights through a hub airport internalizes the negative ef-
fect of separate pricing. An airline alliance is an agreement within a network which
involves multiproduct competition and, since the airline industry shows evidence of
increasing returns to traﬃc density, this means that competition transmits across
routes through costs, a feature that becomes particularly relevant in an environ-
ment with strategic interaction. It therefore suggests that antitrust treatment on
this issue should be carefully looked at. Although alliances can be beneﬁcial to ﬁrms
and/or consumers (for instance by enhancing eﬃciency and service quality), they
can as well signiﬁcantly reduce or eliminate competition on routes where the allied
companies were former competitors. In Europe, competition rules (i.e. Articles 81
and 82 of the EU Treaty) are fully applicable to air transport. Indeed the parties,
in their seeking for authorization, try and oﬀer arguments so that the Commission
gives an individual exemption based on Article 81(3).4 The Commission clears or
prohibits airline mergers on the basis of Merger Regulation 4064/89, amended by
Regulation 1310/97. In the United States, the Department of Transportation (DOT)
had the authority over airline mergers until 1989. Since then, the Antitrust Division
of the Department of Justice reviews airline mergers and acquisitions, although the
DOT retains authority over some matters. Thus, the Antitrust Division has chal-
lenged agreements in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act and/or section 7 of
the Clayton Act. Overall, there are no clear guidelines but many airline alliances
receive antitrust immunity subject to conditions, which range from the surrender
of take-oﬀ and landing slots and the guarantee that partners do not increase fre-
quencies to obstruct entry, to the limitation or the extension in the use of frequent
3Brueckner (2003), using data from the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Passenger Origin-
Destination Survey, concludes that airline alliances lead to lower interline fares. His analysis shows
that, when combined codesharing and antitrust immunity, airline cooperation leads to a reduction
in interline fares between 17% and 30%.
4Article 81(1) prohibits agreements between ﬁrms that encompass ﬁxing prices, sharing markets
and so on. However, paragraph 3 allows for an exemption on the application of paragraph 1 if the
proposed agreements satisfy certain requirements such as the promotion of technical progress to
the consumers beneﬁt.
4ﬂyer programs. One way or the other, the partners receive a lenient treatment by
antitrust authorities since they can determine fares for interline trips in a way that
would not otherwise be possible.5 By now, close cooperation between European
and US authorities has been intensiﬁed regarding transatlantic alliance cases; with
regard to "open skies" agreements, the EU and the US are relaunching negotiations
to create a common air space.
To illustrate our analysis let us consider the following simple network structure.
Suppose that a passenger wishes to travel from Madrid to Washington. She can ﬂy
via Chicago O’Hare International or via Amsterdam Schiphol. In the former case,
Madrid - Chicago is provided by Iberia (e.g. IB6275) and Chicago - Washington R.
Reagan National is operated by American Airlines (e.g. AA1730). In the latter, the
passenger can ﬂy with KLM/AF from Madrid to Amsterdam (e.g. KL1708) and
then make the trip between Amsterdam and Washington Dulles International with
Northwest (e.g. NW8651). As it turns out, Iberia and American Airlines belong to
the Oneworld alliance. On the other hand, KLM/AF and Northwest are partners in
The Sky Team. Alternatively, a passenger travelling from Frankfurt to Minneapolis
may ﬂy either with Lufthansa (e.g. LH4670) and Northwest (e.g. NW0041) via
Amsterdam Schiphol; or with Delta Airlines (e.g. DL0027) and Airtran Airways
(e.g. FL857) via Atlanta Hartsﬁeld-Jackson.6 As it turns out, these four ﬁrms are
independent carriers. We will provide a theoretical explanation to this type of ob-
served phenomena as a result of strategic behavior.
Travellers perceive a composite trip using two or more airlines as a diﬀerentiated
product from other substitute composite trips. That diﬀerentiation can be explained
by a number of reasons such as brand loyalty, frequent ﬂyer programs, frequency of
services, quality considerations and so on. In addition, there is empirical evidence
5The reader might like to look at "Airline Alliances and Mergers - The Emerging Commis-
sion Policy" (2001) by J. Stragier; the statement by R. Hewitt Pate from the Antitrust Division
concerning "International Aviation Alliances: Market Turmoil and the Future of Airline Compe-
tition" (2001); and the report "Entry and Competition in the US Airline Industry: Issues and
Opportunities" (1999), by the Transportation Research Board.
6The reader can access www.airwise.com and ﬁnd plenty of examples where a passenger must
change planes on their way to ﬁnal destination where carriers belong to the same alliance or not;
trips can be made through diﬀerent hubs.
5that the airline industry, after deregulation, exhibits increasing returns to traﬃc
density (see Brueckner and Spiller, 1994, and Creel and Farell, 2001). The model
that we propose will consider a network structure to capture competition between
routes through diﬀerent hubs. It is our purpose to evaluate the role played by market
size, the degree of product diﬀerentiation and the intensity of economies of traﬃc
density as factors that cause strategic airline alliances to show up. We will look at
the endogenous formation of airline alliances by means of a two-stage game where
ﬁrst airlines simultaneous and independently decide whether to form an alliance
a n dt h e n ,g i v e nt h ei n h e r i t e do u t c o m eo ft h eﬁrst stage, fares are simultaneous and
independently determined. Speciﬁcally, the aim of our paper is to analyze the prof-
itability and the strategic eﬀects of two complementary alliances, following diﬀerent
paths, that may be formed to serve a certain city-pair market. We wish to answer
the following questions: when are alliances proﬁtable for the potential partners?,
what are their eﬀects on outsiders?, what is the outsiders’ optimal response? and
how are fares and travel volumes aﬀected?
Our main ﬁndings can be summarized as follows. Firstly, the formation of a
complementary alliance is shown to hurt outsiders and that fares will decrease in
the interline market. Secondly, in contrast to what might be expected, the for-
mation of two alliances (double alliance) is not always the equilibrium outcome.
This is a particularly remarkable result because integration of complementary goods
together with the presence of economies of traﬃc density are elements that favor
the proﬁtability of alliance agreements. Thus, a suﬃciently high degree of prod-
uct diﬀerentiation is enough to ensure the double alliance equilibrium, regardless of
market size and the size of the economies of traﬃc density, since the intensity of
competition is weak. At the other extreme, if product diﬀerentiation is low enough
then no alliance will occur in equilibrium. This may also occur for small economies
of traﬃc density when a low enough degree of product diﬀerentiation is combined
with high enough market size. Interestingly enough, asymmetric equilibrium with a
single alliance may arise as the degree of product diﬀerentiation increases. Broadly
speaking, the single alliance equilibrium shows up for intermediate values of market
size together with economies of traﬃc density that are not too signiﬁcant. This
result provides an explanation about why some carriers decide to remain non-allied
6(e.g. Japan Airlines) and in several routes only one alliance oﬀers interline tickets.7
Furthermore, the market equilibrium can be a double alliance and yet the carriers
be better oﬀ in a no alliance situation for a suﬃciently low degree of product dif-
ferentiation.
The existing literature on airline alliances is sparse. A number of papers have
focused on providing reasons and conditions under which hub-and-spoke networks
are equilibrium structures.8 There only exist a few theoretical contributions on
airline alliances, ﬁrst initiated by Brueckner and Spiller (1991) who developed a
hub-and-spoke model where an airline is considered as a multiproduct ﬁrm with
cost complementarities. These theoretical analyses include Park (1997), Brueckner
(2001), Brueckner and Whalen (2000), Hassin and Shy (2004) and Bilotkach (2005).
The latter three references assume product diﬀerentiation although only Brueckner
and Whalen (2000) considers economies of traﬃcd e n s i t y . I ti sP a r k( 1 9 9 7 )w h o
examined the consequences of parallel and complementary alliances on output lev-
els, proﬁts and welfare. Complementary alliances are analyzed by Brueckner and
Whalen (2000) and Brueckner (2001) under diﬀerent network structures. We will
also address this type of alliances where emphasis is put on the strategic ratio-
nale for alliance formation. Brueckner (2001) considers two airlines to study the
eﬀect of alliances on traﬃc levels and fares both in the inter-hub and the domes-
tic markets. Hassin and Shy (2004) also examine codesharing agreements among
airlines competing on international routes and show that codesharing including all
carriers is welfare improving. Brueckner and Whalen (2000) contemplate that an
international passenger may normally opt between several carrier pairs when mak-
ing an interline trip. They develop a particular example where aggregate demand
does not vary either with the degree of substitutability or the number of products.
This is a satisfactory property when dealing with more than two ﬁrms but there
may be some routes that are better accounted for when total travel volumes are
not ﬁxed. Brueckner and Whalen (2000) consider the no alliance, the symmetric
and the asymmetric alliance situations where domestic markets are operated by two
competing carriers; their focus is on the theoretical and empirical price eﬀects of
7For instance, most of the one-stop routes between Italy and France are only served by The Sky
Team (e.g. the route Rome Fiumicino - Nantes Atlantique).
8See Oum et al. (1995), Berechman et al. (1998), Hendricks et al. (1999), Barla and Constan-
tatos (2000) and Brueckner (2004).
7international airline alliances.9 Our paper is also related with Bilotkach (2005), who
develops a model of price competition among four carriers where two alliances are
possible to examine their eﬀects on fares and travel volumes with assuming constant
returns to scale; unlike Brueckner and Whalen (2000), this author includes routes
between hub airports. Our analysis complements these earlier contributions and
takes a game theoretical approach to examine strategic alliance formation. A com-
plete characterization of the diﬀerent equilibria is provided in terms of market size,
the degree of product diﬀerentiation and the intensity of economies of traﬃcd e n s i t y .
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model presenting
the pre-alliance equilibrium and the equilibria arising from the situations with a
single and a double alliance, respectively. The eﬀects on fares and travel volumes
are analyzed in Section 3. A simultaneous two-stage game of airline alliances is then
presented in Section 4. A brief concluding section closes the paper.
2T h e m o d e l
Basic Assumptions
The model’s network structure is shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1:T h eN e t w o r k
Airline 1 operates route AH, airline 2 serves route HB, airline 3 provides the
ﬂight AK and airline 4 operates route KB and all of them enjoy monopoly power
9The eﬀect of airline alliances has also been empirically investigated by Oum et al. (1996), Park
and Zhang (1998) and Brueckner (2003), among many others. These studies provide evidence that
international alliances lead to lower fares, increases in the number of passengers on the relevant
routes and that airline cooperation generates important beneﬁts for interline passengers.
8in their respective routes. They face standard linear demand functions qi = α − pi,
where qi represents the travel volume, pi denotes the fare charged by airline i for
i =1 ,2,3,4 and α is a positive parameter that measures market size.10 In addition,
there are travellers wishing to ﬂyf r o mc i t yA to city B (interline market) either
through airport H or through airport K. We assume there are no travellers willing
to ﬂy between H and K.11 In this case, travellers must ﬂy by either combining
airlines 1 and 2 or by combining airlines 3 and 4 so that routes AH and HB are
regarded as complementary products (just as routes AK and KB together). How-
ever, the trips through airport H and airport K a r ev i e w e db yt r a v e l l e r sa ss u b s t i t u t e
trips. There is no direct ﬂight connecting cities A and B so that passengers have to
interline at the hubs H and K. The proposed network structure is the simplest pos-
sible conﬁguration including rivalry between two composite one-stop trips. It aims
at capturing the particular aspect of alliances that enjoy antitrust immunity, where
two diﬀerent carriers may cooperate to oﬀer interline trips in which passengers need
to travel with both of them. We consider that cooperation is full, which implies that
the alliance will behave as a single carrier in the market for which it is formed at
the eyes of the passengers.
We will assume that demand functions for air travel between cities A and B are
linear as follows,
Q12 = α − (p1 + p2)+d(p3 + p4) (1)
Q34 = α − (p3 + p4)+d(p1 + p2),
where Q12 and Q34 represent the travel volumes on the two interline ﬂights in the
market and d, that ranges between 0 and 1, captures the degree of product diﬀeren-
tiation taking value 0 when products are independent and 1 when they are perfectly
homogeneous. This demand system for diﬀerentiated products follows from solving
10Note that, for low and medium density routes, the proportion of monopolist city-pair markets
is very important. For the case of the low density routes, this proportion in Europe and the US
accounts for 90% and 77% on short routes and for 79% and 94% on medium-haul routes, respec-
tively. For the case of the medium density routes, this proportion in Europe and the US accounts
for 87% and 86% on short routes and for 35% and 71% on medium-haul routes, respectively. See
the IATA report "Air Transport Markets in Europe and the US, a comparison" (2001).
11In considering an inter-hub demand each carrier would operate in three markets. Then, the
eﬀects of alliances would be more complex because a complementary alliance in an interline market
would have eﬀects in all the three markets for each carrier.
9the optimization problem of a representative passenger with a quasi-linear utility
function a la Dixit (1979)12 and it reﬂects that composite products are substitutes
for one another up to some extent.13
Brueckner and Whalen (2000) provide an interesting interpretation of this kind
of demand functions in terms of brand loyalty, since an increase in price of one
composite product permits the competitor to "steal" a certain amount of traﬃc
volume (total travel volume is constant) but both competitors remain in the market.
A and B are assumed equidistant to H and K and a common cost function
C(qi +Qxy) applies to each of the four links in the network where qi +Qxy accounts
for the total traﬃc volume using a particular link with xy =1 2for i =1 ,2 and
xy =3 4for i =3 ,4. As in Brueckner and Spiller (1991), we assume linear marginal
cost functions of the form:
C
0(qi + Qxy)=1− θ(qi + Qxy),( 2 )
that reﬂect increasing returns to traﬃc density,14 which is a required assumption in
airline markets.15 The intensity of the economics of traﬃc density is measured by
12A representative passenger maximizes U(Q12,Q 34)=( α





This type of utility function has been used by Singh and Vives (1984) and by Economides and Salop
(1992). We are therefore assuming an equal size of the market (α) both for the interline and for the
short markets. A natural extension of the model would be to introduce asymmetric market sizes
by supposing larger short markets. This extension complicates the presentation without oﬀering
any additional insights. Results are qualitatively similar as long as the diﬀerence between the two
market sizes remains suﬃciently small.
13As in other papers in the literature, we assume that the interline fare is the sum of the fares
for markets AH and BH (or AK and BK). Such an assumption implies that a carrier gives
equal treatment to all passengers on its ﬂight. In contrast, it seems closer to reality to consider
that a carrier sets a fare for passengers stopping at the hub and a "subfare" for those doing the
interline trip, as done by Brueckner and Whalen (2000) and Brueckner (2001). This practice,
which would lead to diﬀerent constraints on the parameters, entails some degree of coordination
between carriers even under the pre-alliance situation. We keep the former pricing behavior for
analytical reasons and to better capture the move from a purely non-cooperative setting to others
involving cooperation.
14For instance, the cost function corresponding to link AH is: C(q1 + Q12)=( q1 + Q12)(1 −
θ(q1+Q12)
2 ).
15Brueckner et al. (1992) and Park (1997) also use this marginal cost function, suggested by
Brueckner and Spiller (1991), to model economics of traﬃc density that can be considered as a
stylized fact of the airline industry as showed in the empirical literature on airlines. See for instance
Brueckner and Spiller (1994) or Creel and Farell (2001).
10θ ≥ 0 where constant returns correspond to θ =0 .
The pre-alliance equilibrium
We begin by characterizing the pre-alliance solution. Airlines choose non-cooperatively
their respective proﬁt-maximizing fares. In this situation the fare to travel from A to
B (either through H or through K) is just the sum of the fares of the two short mar-
kets (either p1+p2 or p3+p4). The proﬁt functions are πi = pi(qi+Qxy)−C(qi+Qxy)
again with xy =1 2for i =1 ,2 and xy =3 4for i =3 ,4. The system of ﬁrst order
c o n d i t i o n si sg i v e nb y∂π1/∂p1 =0 , ∂π2/∂p2 =0 , ∂π3/∂p3 =0and ∂π4/∂p4 =0 .
Fulﬁllment of the second order conditions require that θ<1. The equilibrium price,
w h i c hi ss y m m e t r i ca c r o s sm a r k e t s( h e n c ew eo m i ts u b s c r i p t si and xy), is given by,
p
na =
2(α(1 − 2θ)+1 )
5 − 2d − 6θ +4 dθ
,
where superscript na denotes the no-alliances scenario. Equilibrium travel volumes
and proﬁts are the following:
q
na =
α(3 − 2d − 2θ) − 2
5 − 2d − 6θ +4 dθ
, Q
na =
α(1 + 2d − 4θd+2 θ) − 4(1 − d)










The equilibrium proﬁts consist of the margin (price minus average cost) times
the travel volume in both the short and the interline markets. Clearly, there exist
some conditions regarding market size, α, the degree of product diﬀerentiation, d,
and the size of economies of traﬃc density, θ, for which positive prices, positive
travel volumes, positive margins and positive marginal costs are obtained.
The single alliance equilibrium
With a single alliance, either airlines 1 and 2 set the fare for ﬂight from A
to B through hub H cooperatively while competition with ﬂight through hub K
remains, or it is airlines 3 and 4 that set cooperatively the fare through hub K
while competition with ﬂight through hub H remains. Denote by Pp the fare of the
interline ﬂight established jointly by the partners in the alliance. The alternative
interline ﬂight is priced separately, po1 + po2, where subscripts o1 and o2 stand for
11the two outsiders. Both alliance partners are symmetric and both outsiders too.
The demand functions for the short markets do not change but, in market AB
they now take the form: Qp = α − Pp + d(po1 + po2) for the alliance partners and
Qo = α − (po1 + po2)+dPp for outsiders. Thus, alliance partners choose two fares
since they price separately the short and the interline market in which they operate.
The joint proﬁtf u n c t i o nf o rt h ep a r t n e r s ,p1 and p2, becomes πp = pp1qp1+pp2qp2+
PpQp−C(qp1+Qp)−C(qp2+Qp) and for the outsiders are the same as before. Solving
the system formed by ∂πp/∂pp1 =0 , ∂πp/∂pp2 =0 ,∂ π o1/∂po1 =0 ,∂ π o2/∂po2 =0




4dθ(1 + α − 2αθ)+2 d2(2θ − 1)(α(3θ − 1) − 1) − (6θ − 5)(α(5θ − 2) − 2)
54θ − 20 − 36θ





4(2 − 3θ)(α(2θ − 1) − 1) + d(1 − 2θ)(α(7θ − 2) − 4)
54θ − 20 − 36θ





4d(2 − 5θ)(α(2θ − 1) − 1) + (5 − 6θ)(α(7θ − 2) − 4)
54θ − 20 − 36θ
2 +2 d2(2 + θ(10θ − 9))
,
where superscript a identiﬁes the single alliance scenario.16 The second order con-
ditions for a maximum now require that θ<2
3. This condition follows from the
negativity of the Hessian matrix corresponding to the optimization problem of the




4d2(1 − 2θ)(αθ − 2) + (5 − 6θ)(4 − α(2 + θ)) − 4d(2 − θ)(1 − α(2θ − 1))
54θ − 20 − 36θ





2(3θ − 2)(α +2 αθ − 4) − 2d2(5θ − 2)(α(2θ − 1) − 2) − d(2θ − 3)(α(7θ − 2) − 4)
54θ − 20 − 36θ





4dθ(α(2θ − 1) − 1) − (2 + α(θ − 2))(6θ − 5) + 2d2(2θ − 1)(1 + α(2θ − 1))
54θ − 20 − 36θ





d(2θ − 1)(α(7θ − 2) − 4) − 2(3θ − 2)(2 + α(2θ − 3)) + 2d2α(2 + θ(10θ − 9))
54θ − 20 − 36θ
2 +2 d2(2 + θ(10θ − 9))
.















16It is important to know that, when the long market is priced jointly, the stability of the
network requires non-arbitrage conditions to apply. These conditions are of two types. The ﬁrst
type prevents passengers willing to do a short market trip (AH or BH) from buying an interline
ticket (AB ticket) and then get oﬀ at the hub airport (H airport). The second type of conditions
ensure that nobody would buy an interline ticket if breaking down the trip into two parts were
cheaper.





















The alliance "partially unbundles" the interline from the short markets since the
interline market is priced separately. Nevertheless, partners are not able to extract
monopoly proﬁts because markets remain connected through the link-dependent
cost function. One can observe that (3) and (4) have the same structure whereas
(5) is diﬀerent. In (5) there are two margins: one corresponding to the short mar-
ket (price minus the average cost) and another one corresponding to the interline
market (price minus twice the average cost) since the interline market needs to use
two links of the network while the short market just needs to use one link.
T h ed o u b l ea l l i a n c ee q u i l i b r i u m
We now characterize the situation when two interline alliances are formed, that
is, when airlines 1 and 2 behave cooperatively in setting fares and so do airlines
3 and 4. Denote by P12 and P34 the fare of the interline ﬂight through hub H
and hub K, respectively. The interline market demands are now given by Q12 =
α − P12 + dP34 and Q34 = α − P34 + dP12.J o i n tp r o ﬁt maximization results in the
following symmetric equilibrium prices (hence we omit subscripts):
P
aa =
4+2 α − 7αθ
4 − 2d − 6θ +5 dθ
, p
aa =
(3d − 5)αθ +( 1+α)(2 − d)
4 − 2d − 6θ +5 dθ
and we employ superscripts aa for the case where both alliances occur. As in the
single alliance equilibrium, the second order conditions for a maximum impose that
θ<2
3. The corresponding travel volumes and proﬁts are given by,
Q
aa =
(2 + θ)α − 4+d(4 − 2αθ)
4 − 2d − 6θ +5 dθ
, q
aa =
(2d − 1)αθ − (α − 1)(d − 2)
4 − 2d − 6θ +5 dθ












Before characterizing the eﬀects of alliances and the Nash equilibrium in alliance
formation, there are a number of restrictions that must be borne in mind. This
amounts to comparing a number of bounds on market size α.
13Assumption 1 A market in our model is deﬁned by a triple {d,θ,α}.W e r e -
strict attention to markets {d,θ,α} ∈ R where R is the relevant region in our
analysis, i.e., the region ensuring positive prices, quantities, marginal costs,
margins and the compliance with non-arbitrage conditions are guaranteed in
the three scenarios under consideration (pre-alliance, single alliance and double
alliance). See Appendix 1 for the details.
3E ﬀects on Fares and Travel Volumes
We will begin by comparing the changes in ﬁrms’ fares and travel volumes in a
move from the pre-alliance situation to the single alliance situation. Then, we will
establish the corresponding variations when two alliances are formed rather than a
single one.
Proposition 1 For any market {d,θ,α} ∈ R, the formation of a complementary
alliance has the following eﬀects:
i) For the partners, the fare Pa
p is lower than the pre-alliance fare pna + pna and
travel volume increases, i.e. Qa
p >Q na (direct eﬀect).
ii) Outsiders’ fares and travel volumes are lower, i.e. pa
o <p na and Qa
o <Q na
(outsider eﬀect).
iii) As for the short markets, since pa
o <p na, we observe that qa
o >q na.F o r t h e
allied carriers, the eﬀects on pp and qp are unclear.
Proof. See Appendix 2.
The above results partially conﬁrm Cournot’s (1838) model of complementary
duopoly. Cournot considered the merger of two monopolists that produce comple-
mentary goods (zinc and copper) into a single (fused) monopolist that produces the
combination of them (brass). The price of the composite good is lower than un-
der independent ownership (direct eﬀect). The alliance between airlines that oﬀer
complementary services internalizes the externality that arises when they set fares
independently thus ignoring the eﬀects on their individual markups. This result,
part i) above, has already been suggested by earlier theoretical work by Brueckner
(2001) and Brueckner and Whalen (2000) although under somewhat diﬀerent mod-
eling and network structures. Indeed empirical evidence in Brueckner and Whalen
14(2000) and Brueckner (2003) ﬁnd that alliance partners charge interline fares that
are below those charged when they were non-allied.
T os e et h ei n t u i t i o n ,n o t et h a tt h eﬁrst order conditions in the single alliance sit-
uation implicitly deﬁne the corresponding reaction functions in prices.17 Whenever
θ<1
2, which is almost always the case, the eﬀects implied by the reaction functions








) and po = f(Pp
+
). Therefore, the decrease in the
interline fare induced by the alliance leads to a reduction in the fares set by outsiders
since Pp and po are strategic complements. Rather obviously a lower interline fare
permits partners to capture a higher travel volume and this occurs at the expense
of a lower interline traﬃc by the rivals. On the other hand, since the outsiders’
fares are lower than under the pre-alliance situation it follows that there is a gain
in travel volumes for short trips.
Besides, the decrease in the interline fare induces a reduction in the fare pp but
this fare increases due to the indirect eﬀect via the decrease in the fare of outsiders.
The ﬁnal eﬀect on partners’ fare and travel volumes for their short trips depend on
market size, the degree of product diﬀerentiation and the intensity of economies of
traﬃc density. Although allied carriers are monopolists in their short markets, they
cannot extract monopoly proﬁts because the equilibrium prices and quantities are
linked through the cost function because costs are link-dependent and not market
dependent. Therefore, there is an output reallocation eﬀect aﬀecting the partners in
their short market equilibrium values causing a non-monotonic relationship of prices
and quantities when an alliance to serve the interline market is formed.
An interesting by-product of the previous analysis is that, for outsiders, the
revenue in the interline market decreases since both the fare and the travel volume
are lower in a move to a single alliance setting (outsider eﬀect). Further, revenue in
the short market is unclear because the variation in fare goes in the opposite direction
to the one in travel volume. Finally, as total travel volume by the outsiders decreases
this means that average costs are larger; the output reallocation makes carriers to
take less proﬁt from the presence of economies of traﬃc density. Consequently,
outsiders will very likely be harmed by the formation of an alliance. Boyer (1992)
17These are the three reaction functions for the single alliance case:
Pp =
2+α(1−4θ)+2(1−2θ)dpo+2θpp
2(1−θ) , pp =
1+α(1−2θ)+θPp−2θdpo
2−θ and po =
2+2α(1−2θ)+(1−2θ)dPp
5−6θ .T h e s e
functions are not always upward or downward sloping since they depend on whether θ is higher or
lower than 1
2.
15suggests that non-participating ﬁrms in a merger may be harmed by a merger. He
argues that this is more likely to occur if there are inter-market connections. This is
the case in the current setting where markets are linked through the cost function.
The next proposition summarizes the comparison of ﬁrms’ fares and travel vol-
umes involved in the single and double alliance equilibria. Notice that the term
outsiders will now allude to the airlines that had previously formed an alliance.
Proposition 2 For any market {d,θ,α} ∈ R, the formation of two complementary
alliances as opposed to a single alliance has the following eﬀects:
i) For the new partners, the fare Paa is lower than their single alliance fare 2pa
o and
travel volume increases, i.e. Qaa >Q a
o (direct eﬀect).
ii) Outsiders’ fares and travel volumes are lower, i.e. Paa <P a
p and Qaa <Q a
p
(outsider eﬀect).
iii) We observe that paa >p a
p (and qaa <q a
p), which is the opposite to the move from
the no alliance to the single alliance situation, in the outsiders’s short markets. For
the new allied carriers, the eﬀects on po and qo are unclear.
Proof. See Appendix 2.
Again, the alliance of the new partners results in lower fares for their interline
market. Given that prices set by the new partners and by outsiders in the interline
market are strategic complements (upward sloping reaction functions), it follows that
the interline fare of the already allied carriers (now outsiders) goes down. Thus, the
direct and the outsider eﬀects work in the same way as in Proposition 1. However,
the eﬀect on the outsiders’ short markets is now diﬀerent. In the case of Proposition
1(iii) above, the decrease in the price in the short market was a consequence of the
outsider eﬀect since the price on the interline market was the sum of the price of
two short markets. Now this is not the case anymore and the outsiders react to the
alliance by increasing their short market fares.
As in the move from no alliance to single alliance, there is an output realloca-
tion eﬀect aﬀecting the new allied carriers in their short market equilibrium values
causing a non-monotonic relationship of prices and quantities when moving from a
single to a double alliance scenario.
To sum up, concerning outsiders’ interline market, alliance formation is disad-
vantageous in terms of revenue no matter they set fares cooperatively (Proposition
2) or non-cooperatively (Proposition 1) in the interline market. Hence, a setting
16with interline alliances leads to lower fares, which is consistent with some observed
facts in the airline industry, as found by Brueckner (2003).
4 A simultaneous game of airline alliances
The foregoing analysis suggests that airline alliances are proﬁtable only under some
circumstances. The formation of airline alliances is endogenously obtained as a
result of the following two-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage airlines 1 and 2 and airlines
3 and 4 decide simultaneously and independently whether to form an alliance. In
stage two, given the inherited outcome from the ﬁrst stage, airlines set fares.
Given the symmetry in the model it suﬃces to study the best-response of the
potential partners (either airlines 1 and 2, or alternatively 3 and 4) i) when the
rivals decide not to form a complementary alliance, and ii) w h e nt h er i v a l sd e c i d e








Therefore Ψa(d,θ,α) > 0 deﬁnes when airlines 1 and 2 (alternatively 3 and 4)
will form an alliance given that the rivals do not.18 The following lemma results from
the analysis of this unilateral incentive to form an alliance. Suﬃcient conditions are
given in parenthesis.
Lemma 1 For any market {d,θ,α} ∈ R, whenever the rivals decide not to form an
alliance, two potential partners:
i) will form an alliance either for a suﬃcient degree of product diﬀerentiation (d ≤
d








iii) will either form or not form an alliance for values of d ∈ (d
a,d
a
].I nt h i sc a s e ,
an alliance will not be formed for high values of α combined with low values of θ.
Proof. See Appendix 2.
18It is assumed that proﬁts are equally shared by partners once they decide to ally and set up a
complementary alliance.
17This lemma states that a suﬃciently high degree of product diﬀerentiation guar-
antees at least one alliance in equilibrium. On the other hand, when products are
close substitutes, which supposes that competition intensity is strong, it is preferable
to remain non-allied given that the rivals do not form an alliance. In this case, it is
strategically proﬁtable for carriers not to cooperate. For values between the speci-
ﬁed thresholds, either strategy might be the best-response (BR)d e p e n d i n go nt h e
speciﬁc value of the parameters. Figure 2 below constitutes a representative example
for d ∈ (d
a,d
a
],19 where α(θ) is obtained from solving Ψa(d =0 .835,θ,α)=0 .
Figure 2: BR when rivals do not form an alliance
Values below (above) the function α(θ) identify those cases where, as long as
both the lower and the upper bounds on α are respected, the best-response is (not)
to form an alliance. One can observe that larger values of θ create incentives for
alliance formation since they foster eﬃciency gains. In fact, as stated in the lemma,
as u ﬃciently high θ ensures a single alliance for any market {d,θ,α} ∈ R.O nt h e
other hand, it seems that carriers operating in large markets (α) are less willing to
form alliances when the rivals do not do it. Furthermore, as the degree of product
diﬀerentiation decreases (higher values of d), the function α(θ) shifts downwards,
thereby enlarging the region for no alliance to be the best-response.
19As stated in Assumption 1,m a r k e t s{d,θ,α} ∈ R require to respect some bounds on θ and α.
Following the notation in Appendix 1, θ(d)=L2, α(d,θ)=B2 and α(d,θ)=B3 when d =0 .835.
18To see the intuition note that the change in a carrier’s proﬁts when moving to
a single alliance setting can be decomposed in three terms. The ﬁrst one is related
with the variation in revenue from the interline market (∆RI); the second one comes
from the diﬀerence in revenue in the short market (∆RS); and the third one has to
do with the change in costs due to the reallocation in travel volumes. Only the latter
variation has got an unambiguous sign. It happens that total travel volume by the
allied carriers increases (Qa
p + qa
p >Q na + qna) .S i n c ew eh a v ea l r e a d ya r g u e dt h a t
the joint cost function exhibits increasing returns to traﬃc density in the supply of
interline and short trips, higher travel volumes imply a better exploitation of these
economies of traﬃc density. Concerning the ﬁrst term, it has been shown above
that the interline fare goes down while travel volume goes up (direct eﬀect). It can
be proven that ∆RI = f(d
−,θ
−,α
+),i . e .t h ef a r ee ﬀect is more likely to dominate the
travel volume eﬀect, other things equal, the higher the market size; the higher the
degree of product diﬀerentiation; or the smaller the intensity of economies of traﬃc
density. As for the second term, the variation associated with the revenue from the
short market cannot be neatly established since it involves non-monotonic eﬀects,
but numerical examples indicate that ∆RS is more likely to increase when d does
not take intermediate values.
To sum up, there is a positive eﬀect coming from the eﬃciency gains due to cost
savings, that may be oﬀset by possible revenue losses (either in the short or in the
interline market). Lemma 1 states that typically, but not always, the positive eﬀects
outweigh negative ones, this meaning that there is a unilateral incentive to form a
complementary alliance given that the rivals do not form an alliance.
The interesting conclusion from our analysis is that, contrary to what one might
expect for an alliance with complementary trips in presence of economies of traﬃc
density, it is not necessarily optimal for carriers to create an alliance when the other
potential partners remain non-allied. If there were no competition from a substitute
ﬂight, then the alliance would always turn out proﬁtable - as in Cournot’s example.
However, the presence of other airlines serving the interline market unveils that the
alliance will be proﬁtable only under certain circumstances. Therefore, when the
two possible one-stop interline trips are "suﬃciently substitutes" at the eyes of the
traveller, the best-response for two potential partners is not to form an alliance when
the other carriers remain non-allied (e.g. Japan Airlines).
Next we study the best-response of the potential partners when the rivals form a








Hence, Ψaa(d,θ,α) > 0 deﬁnes when airlines 1 and 2 (alternatively 3 and 4) will
form an alliance given that the rivals do. The analysis of Ψaa(d,θ,α) leads to the
following result.
Lemma 2 For any market {d,θ,α} ∈ R, whenever the rivals decide to form an
alliance, two potential partners:
i) will also form an alliance either for a suﬃcient degree of product diﬀerentiation
(d ≤ d








iii) will either form or not form an alliance for values of d ∈ (d
aa,d
aa
]. In this case,
an alliance will not be formed for intermediate values of α combined with low values
of θ.
Proof. See Appendix 2.
Again, a suﬃciently high degree of product diﬀerentiation makes alliances strate-
gically proﬁtable. On the other hand, when products are loose substitutes, double
alliance is not an equilibrium. For values between the speciﬁed bounds, either strat-
egy might be the best-response. Figure 3 below displays a representative example




20As stated in Assumption 1,m a r k e t s{d,θ,α} ∈ R require to respect some bounds on θ and α.
Following the notation in Appendix 1, θ(d)=L2, α(d,θ)=B2 and α(d,θ)=B3 when d =0 .750.
20Figure 3: BR when rivals form an alliance
where we observe, as in Lemma 1, that larger values of θ create incentives for
alliance formation. In this case, a larger market size seems to foster alliance forma-
tion. The functions α1(θ) and α2(θ) are the ones that solve Ψaa(d =0 .750,θ,α)=0 .
Thus, values between these two functions indicate that a single alliance is the best-
response. As the degree of product diﬀerentiation decreases (higher values of d), the
functions α1(θ) and α2(θ) move far apart thereby enlarging the region where single
alliance is the best-response.
Although the interpretation of Lemma 2 is as before, it is important to notice
that the suﬃcient conditions to ensure a double alliance are now more stringent,
i.e. either a higher degree of product diﬀerentiation (d
aa <d
a) or a higher intensity




) is required. Therefore, we can anticipate
that there will be cases in which the best-response can be to form an alliance if
the rivals do not; but not to form an alliance if the rivals decide to do so, i.e.
Ψa(d,θ,α) > 0 and Ψaa(d,θ,α) < 0. The fact that a setting with two alliances may
n o ta l w a y sb ep r i v a t e l yp r o ﬁtable, certainly opens the door to asymmetric equilibria
which is sometimes a real issue in the airline industry; in fact, there is an important
number of routes where only one international alliance provides interline services
(e.g. most of the one-stop routes between Italy and France are only served by The
Sky Team). Nevertheless, it must be noted that Ψa(d,θ,α) < 0 is not compatible
with Ψaa(d,θ,α) > 0 so that multiple equilibria cannot arise.
21In the double alliance setting, total travel volume for the new partners increases,
that is, Qaa + qaa >Q a
o + qa
o. This means that the alliance produces an output
reallocation eﬀect which allows the new partners to take advantage of the economies
of traﬃc density. Besides, a similar analysis to the previous lemma unveils that
r e v e n u e si nt h ei n t e r l i n em a r k e ta r eh i g h e rf o ras u ﬃcient degree of product diﬀer-
entiation or for small enough economies of traﬃc density, other things being equal.
On the other hand, the variation in revenues from the short market is negative for
intermediate values of product diﬀerentiation or for large enough economies of traﬃc
density, other things equal. Thus, the above result states that the gains stemming
from travel volume restructuring and interline earnings more than compensate the
losses originated from lower revenues in the short market as long as competition
intensity be suﬃciently weak, no matter the size of the economies of traﬃcd e n s i t y .
Nevertheless, the losses may be more important than the gains as either competition
intensity becomes stronger, or if economies of traﬃc density are not too signiﬁcant
or market size is large enough.
In the light of the best-responses studied above, we can easily identify the sub-
game perfect equilibrium of the game. The next proposition combines the results
stated in the previous two lemmas and singles out suﬃcient conditions under which
the three possible scenarios are an equilibrium of the game in alliance formation.
In particular, it addresses the corresponding equilibrium for the whole range of the
v a l u e so ft h ed e g r e eo fp r o d u c td i ﬀerentiation. It should nonetheless be kept in mind
that θ>θ
a
ensures at least one alliance and that θ>θ
aa
ensures two alliances.21






,t h e r ea r eﬁv er e g i o n st ob ec o n s i d e r e d .
Proposition 3 For any market {d,θ,α} ∈ R, the equilibrium in alliance formation
is:
i) no alliance for d>d
a
;




]. No alliance will be the
equilibrium for high values of α combined with low values of θ;




] depending on the joint eﬀect of α and θ;
iv) either single alliance or double alliance for d ∈ (d
aa,d
a].S i n g l ea l l i a n c ew i l lb e
for intermediate values of α combined with low values of θ;
21This means that the no alliance equilibrium in the next proposition, can only arise for markets
{d,θ,α} ∈ R with θ<θ
a
.
22v) double alliance for d ≤ d
aa.
The proof is straightforward. We conclude that a setting with complementary
alliances arises when the two possible interline trips are strongly diﬀerentiated,
whereas alliances will not take place in equilibrium when trips are viewed by trav-
ellers as close substitutes. It is worth mentioning that, for intermediate values of
the degree of product diﬀerentiation, an asymmetric equilibrium in which only one
alliance occurs is possible in the current setting. Moreover, the transition from the
region where the equilibrium is no alliance to the one where the equilibrium is dou-
ble alliance is parsimonious since in part ii) above the single alliance equilibrium is
a possibility, in part iii) anything may happen, and in part iv) no alliance is not a
possibility anymore.
The following contention may be useful to illustrate the above proposition. Let
us ﬁx values for market size and economies of traﬃc density and let the degree of
product diﬀerentiation open. Now a pair of carriers have to decide whether to form
an alliance. As argued before, total travel volume by the potential partners increases
when they form an alliance, allowing for a better exploitation of economies of traﬃc
density. However the eﬀects coming from the interline and short market revenues are
not straightforward. Suppose that d is close to one so that competition intensity is
strong. In this case, the internalization of competition that occurs under cooperation
when setting fares results in greater revenues in the short market since the increase
in short trip traﬃc is larger than the decrease in fares; the opposite happens to
revenues from the interline market. In this framework, the latter negative eﬀect
outweighs the other two positive eﬀects and the carriers are better oﬀ not forming
an alliance.
However, as the degree of product diﬀerentiation increases and competition in-
tensity softens, carriers also obtain gains in the interline market thus making the
alliance privately proﬁtable.22 Concerning the rivals, their equilibrium travel vol-
umes go down and the corresponding cost ineﬃciency incurred suﬃces to oﬀset any
likely revenue gains so that alliance formation hurts outsiders. This occurs both in
am o v et ot h esingle alliance equilibrium and from this one to the double alliance
equilibrium. Finally, a suﬃciently large degree of product diﬀerentiation ensures an
22Although there might be losses in the short market for intermediate values of d,t h e s ea r eo ﬀset
by the eﬃciency gains due to traﬃc reallocation and the revenue gains from the interline market.
23equilibrium with airline alliances.23
A deeper analysis of carriers’ proﬁts in the no alliance and the double alliance
settings reveals that the agents may well get engaged in a prisoner’s dilemma situ-







where superscript pd stands for prisoner’s dilemma. Hence, Ψpd(d,θ,α) < 0 con-
cludes that the double alliance is proﬁtable per se; and Ψpd(d,θ,α) > 0 means that
the double alliance leads to a prisoner’s dilemma situation as long as forming an
alliance is a dominant strategy. The fact that outsiders end up worse oﬀ when the
rivals form an alliance is behind this possibility. Therefore, the double alliance can
be the equilibrium outcome and yet the four airlines might indeed ﬁnd themselves
earning lower proﬁts had neither alliance occurred. This can in some sense be con-
sidered as an outcome stemming from a "war of alliances".24 T h en e x tc o r o l l a r y
summarizes this discussion.
Corollary 1 For any market {d,θ,α} ∈ R , whenever double alliance is the equi-
librium in alliance formation, airlines get engaged in a prisoner’s dilemma situation
for a suﬃciently low degree of product diﬀerentiation (d>d pd ≡ 0.355).
Proof. See Appendix 2.
We will ﬁnish this section with presenting the case of constant returns to traﬃc
density, i.e. when θ =0 . The previous analysis discloses the diﬃculties in the char-
acterization of the equilibrium due to the interplay between market size, economies
of traﬃc density and the degree of product diﬀerentiation. The particular solution
for θ =0allows us to illustrate the results when the travel volume reallocation eﬀect
is not present.
23A similar reasoning can be made by letting θ or α vary while keeping the other two variables
ﬁxed.
24A recent reference by Fridolfsson and Stennek (2005) distinguishes mergers that are proﬁtable
per se from those which these authors call "defensive" mergers. The latter would correspond with
a prisoner’s dilemma situation in the current setting.
24When θ =0 , a market is characterized by {d,θ =0 ,α} and region R is deﬁned
accordingly. There is no upper bound on market size α but there remains a lower
bound α(d).25 Figure 4 below depicts region R.
Figure 4:R e g i o nR when θ =0
The next proposition illustrates the complete characterization of the equilibrium
in the formation of airline alliances as a function of the degree of product diﬀerenti-
ation and market size. The functional forms of the expressions α1(d), α2(d), α3(d)
and α4(d) are conveniently speciﬁed in Appendix 2. Subscript 0 identiﬁes values
corresponding to the case of constant returns to traﬃc density.
Proposition 4 Suppose θ =0 . Then, for any market {d,θ =0 ,α} ∈ R ,t h ee q u i -
librium in alliance formation is:
i) no alliance for d>d
a
0;




0]. No alliance will be the equi-
librium for α ≥ α1(d);









0 ].S i n g l e a l l i a n c e f o r
α ∈ (max{α(d),α 2(d)},α 3(d));





0 ≡ 0.829, d
a
0 ≡ 0.817, d
aa
0 ≡ 0.725, d
aa
0 ≡ 0.707.
25This is because the upper bound for α comes from positivity of marginal costs. Since now
marginal costs are constant and positive, such a condition is not required. Following the notation
in Appendix 1, α(d) corresponds to B1 for d<1
2 and to B3 for d>1
2.A t d = 1
2 there is a
discontinuity and B1=B3=1 .
25Proof. See Appendix 2.
As we did when there exist economies of traﬃc density, a detailed analysis of the
double alliance case allows us to classify them in the following corollary.
Corollary 2 Suppose θ =0 .T h e n ,f o ra n ym a r k e t{d,θ =0 ,α} ∈ R ,w h e n e v e r
double alliance is the equilibrium in alliance formation, these alliances can be clas-
siﬁed as follows:
i) double alliance involving a prisoner’s dilemma for d>0.5;
ii) either double alliance involving a prisoner’s dilemma or double alliance proﬁtable
per se for d ∈ (d
pd
0 ,0.5]. In particular, double alliance involving a prisoner’s dilemma
will be the equilibrium for α ≥ α4(d);






Proof. See Appendix 2.
Figure 5 summarizes the above proposition and corollary representing the rele-
vant regions for diﬀerent values of the degree of product diﬀerentiation.
Figure 5: Equilibrium when θ =0
In this particular case, one can observe that asymmetric equilibria (with just
one alliance) arise. Notice too the previously mentioned parsimonious nature of the
26transition from the region where the equilibrium is no alliance to the one where
it is the double alliance.26 This result highlights the positive relationship between
product diﬀerentiation and strategic complementary integration in our setting. The
simpliﬁcation θ =0results in a fairly easy comparison when analyzing Ψa(d,θ =
0,α) and Ψaa(d,θ =0 ,α). It amounts to checking the gains or losses in the interline
market vis-à-vis those in the short market. As competition intensity gets stronger
it is more likely to ﬁnd an equilibrium with just one alliance. Eventually, if the
degree of product diﬀerentiation is rather low and market size is rather large one
can ﬁnd the no alliance equilibrium. Furthermore, and as happened in the presence
of economies of traﬃc density, carriers may get involved in a prisoner’s dilemma
situation unless the degree of product diﬀerentiation be suﬃciently large.
5C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
We have developed a formal model to illustrate how factors such as market size,
the degree of product diﬀerentiation and the intensity of economies of traﬃcd e n -
sity, may explain that (complementary) airline alliances do not always emerge in a
strategic environment. Speciﬁcally, alliances allow carriers to beneﬁt from product
complementarities, which together with the presence of increasing returns to traﬃc
density would make one expect them to be privately proﬁtable. Our ﬁndings indicate
that this is not necessarily so and it seems consistent with some of the observed facts
in the industry. This paper raises an interesting empirical question as it suggests
to study the signiﬁcance of the above mentioned factors in assessing the incentives
of carriers to form strategic alliances. On the other hand, total travel volumes are
higher when either a single or a double alliance arises as long as there is a minimum
degree of economies of traﬃc density, regardless of market size and the degree of
product diﬀerentiation. In the current framework, such an increase in travel vol-
umes would account for a greater consumer surplus. Competition authorities should
therefore favor complementary alliances since consumers would otherwise be worse
oﬀ. Furthermore, our model has identiﬁed parameter conditions under which al-
26For positive values of θ, the relevant region R has a similar shape but it is bounded from above
because positivity of marginal costs requires lower values of α when θ increases. In addition, the
regions on the right side in Figure 5 reduce as θ takes higher values since increases in the intensity
of economies of traﬃc density favor alliance formation.
27liances are privately proﬁtable and, consequently, they would lead to higher welfare
levels.
In addition to the proliferation of airline alliances, there are many other features
that help to characterize the current and future status of the air transportation
landscape such as the surge of low cost carriers, the closing of old hubs and the
development of new ones, the expected evolution of regional operators to join net-
works and so on. Nevertheless, our results are realistic suggesting that the model
captures some important aspects of the airline industry. An interesting question
to be addressed is to endogenize network formation where the structure herein is a
possibility. Further work should explore whether the presence of a low cost carrier
in the network facilitates or hinders the proﬁtability of strategic alliances.
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30Appendix 1: Deﬁnition of the relevant region R.
A number of restrictions on the parameters d,θ and α have to be observed to
ensure positive prices, quantities, marginal costs, margins and the compliance with
non-arbitrage conditions are guaranteed in the three scenarios under consideration.
Markets deﬁned by a triple {d,θ,α} ∈ R guarantee comparable results.
• Bounds on α. Positivity and non-arbitrage conditions in the three considered
scenarios lead to several bounds in α. After comparing all these bounds and se-
lecting the most stringent ones, we obtain α ∈ (α(d,θ),α(d,θ)) with α(d,θ)=





θ(10−12θ+(d−4)d(2θ−1)) and B3 ≡
4d(3θ−2+d(2θ−1))
4d(2+d)−10+27θ−4d(7+5d)θ+6θ2(4d(1+d)−3).27
Speciﬁcally, B1 comes from ensuring positive equilibrium travel volume in the
interline trip for outsiders in the single alliance situation; B2 from positive
marginal cost for partners in the single alliance situation; B3 from the fulﬁll-
ment of a non-arbitrage condition for partners in the single alliance situation.
Notice that B1 can be either a lower or an upper bound.
• An illustrative representation can be displayed in space (θ,d) - see Figure 6.
To this end, we can compute the bounds on θ that come from the diﬀerence
between α(d,θ) and α(d,θ), i.e., the bounds ensuring the existence of a positive







L3 for d ∈ (1
2,0.618]
L2 for d>0.618
where L1 ≡ 2+3d+2d2
2(2+3d+d2), L2 ≡
2d(2+d)−5
2(d−3+2d2) and L3 ≡ 4+d
6+4d.T h ec a s ed = 1
2 is a par-
ticular case: there is a discontinuity and α is bounded below by B1=B3=1
27There are 20 bounds on α to take into account. Let us denote them by B(·), putting in the
argument the equilibrium condition that gives rise to the bound. The precise expressions can be
derived from the equilibrium values provided in the main text. Pre-alliance:B ( qna > 0), B(Qna >
0)B ( 1−θ(qna+Qna) > 0), and B(pna−1+
θ(qna+Qna)
2 > 0); Single alliance:B ( qa
p > 0), B(qa
o > 0),
B(Qa
p > 0), B(Qa
o > 0), B(1 − θ(qa
o+Qa
o) > 0), B(1 − θ(qa
p+Qa









p) > 0), B(pa
p > 0), B(pa
o > 0), B(Pa
p > 0), B(2pa
p−Pa
p > 0)a n dB ( Pa
p −pa
p > 0);






2 > 0)a n dB ( paa − 1+
θ(qaa+Qaa)
2 > 0) simply reduce to α>1.
After comparing all these bounds and selecting the most stringent ones, we are left with B1, B2
and B3 where B1 ≡B(Qa
o > 0), B2 ≡B(1 − θ(qa
p+Qa
p) > 0)a n dﬁnally B3 ≡B(2pa
p − Pa
p > 0).
31and above by B2= 38−52θ
47θ−62θ2 > 1.
Figure 6 below represents L1, L2 and L3. We claim that, for any pair {d,θ} in
the region delimited by L1, L2 and L3,t h e r ee x i s tv a l u e so fα ∈ (α(d,θ),α(d,θ))
such that we can ﬁnd markets {d,θ,α} ∈ R.
Figure 6: Bounds for d and θ in region R
More precisely,
• For d<1
2 and θ<L 1, there exist values of α ∈ (B1,B2) such that we can
ﬁnd markets {d,θ,α} ∈ R.
• For d ∈ (1
2,0.618] and θ ∈ [L1,L3), there exist values of α ∈ (B3,B1) such
that we can ﬁnd markets {d,θ,α} ∈ R.
• For d>1
2 and θ<min(L1,L2), there exist values of α ∈ (B3,B2) such that
we can ﬁnd markets {d,θ,α} ∈ R.
In addition, we know that θ<2
3 from the second order conditions. This means
that economies of traﬃc density cannot be too high. This makes sense because
otherwise marginal costs would become negative.
32Appendix 2: Proofs.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1.
The diﬀerence Pa
p −2pna yields an expression whose denominator is negative for
{d,θ,α} ∈ R. The numerator is positive for α>α ∗ ≡
4(dθ−1)
4d+9θ+12dθ2−6−14dθ−6θ2.W e
now compare α∗ with the corresponding lower bounds in R.T h u s ,f o r d<1
2,t h e
diﬀerence B1− α∗ is positive and, for d>1
2, the diﬀerence B3− α∗ is positive too.
Therefore, α>α ∗ is always veriﬁed in R. It is straightforward to check that α>α ∗
also implies Qa
p >Q na, pa
o <p na, Qa
o <Q na and qa
o >q na.
As for the fares and travel volumes for the partners’ short markets, the diﬀerence
qa
p − qna yields an expression whose denominator is negative for {d,θ,α} ∈ R.T h e
sign of the numerator depends on whether market size α is greater or smaller than
φ1(d,θ)
φ2(d,θ). The function φ1(d,θ) is positive for θ ∈ (θ
−(d),θ







4d(2d2−3) .T h ef u n c t i o nφ2(d,θ) is positive for values
of θ above ˜ θ(d), which is a decreasing function in d, it is discontinuous at d = 1
2 and
it lies above 2
3 for d>1
2.W h e nθ<˜ θ(d) the numerator in qa
p −qna is positive; when
θ>˜ θ(d) the numerator in qa
p −qna is positive for α<
φ1(d,θ)
φ2(d,θ).W eh a v et h ef o l l o w i n g
cases.
• Case d<1
2.F o re v e r y{d,θ,α} ∈ R,
i) for θ<˜ θ(d) the numerator in qa
p −qna is positive and therefore qa
p −qna < 0.
ii) for θ>˜ θ(d),
φ1(d,θ)




p − qna is positive and hence qa
p − qna < 0;i fα>
φ1(d,θ)
φ2(d,θ),t h e n
qa
p − qna > 0.
• Case d = 1
2.F o re v e r y{d,θ,α} ∈ R, the lower bounds on α are B1=B3=1
and the upper bound is B2= 38−52θ
47θ−62θ2 > 1.S i n c et h en u m e r a t o ri nqa
p −qna is
negative for every α< 38−52θ
47θ−62θ2, which is always the case, qa
p − qna is positive.
• Case d>1
2.F o re v e r y{d,θ,α} ∈ R,
i) for θ<θ
−(d) the numerator in qa
p−qna is negative and therefore qa
p−qna > 0.




φ2(d,θ) is positive but smaller than 1. Therefore, for
α>
φ1(d,θ)
φ2(d,θ),t h en u m e r a t o ri nqa
p − qna is negative and qa
p − qna > 0.
33The diﬀerence pa
p − pna follows exactly the opposite pattern.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2.
The diﬀerence Paa −2pa
o yields an expression whose denominator is negative for
{d,θ,α} ∈ R. The numerator is positive for α>α ∗,a sp r e v i o u s l yd e ﬁned, and it
follows straightforward that Qaa >Q a
o, Paa <P a
p, Qaa <Q a
p, paa >p a
p and qaa <q a
p.
As for the fares and travel volumes for the partners’ short markets, the diﬀerence
qaa − qa
o yields an expression whose denominator is negative for {d,θ,α} ∈ R.T h e
sign of the numerator depends on whether market size α is greater or smaller than
φ1(d,θ)
φ2(d,θ). The function φ1(d,θ) is positive for θ ∈ (θ
−(d),θ







4d(5d2−6) . The function φ2(d,θ) is positive for
values of θ above ˜ θ(d), which is a decreasing function in d, it is discontinuous at
d = 1
2 and it lies above 2
3 for d>1
2.W h e n θ<˜ θ(d) the numerator in qaa − qa
o is
positive; when θ>˜ θ(d) the numerator in qaa − qa
o is positive for α<
φ1(d,θ)
φ2(d,θ).W e
have the following cases.
• Case d<1
2.F o re v e r y{d,θ,α} ∈ R,
i) for θ<˜ θ(d) the numerator in qaa−qa
o is positive and therefore qaa−qa
o < 0.
ii) for θ>˜ θ(d),
φ1(d,θ)




o is positive and hence qaa−qa




• Case d = 1
2.F o re v e r y{d,θ,α} ∈ R, the lower bounds on α are B1=B3=1
and the upper bound is B2= 38−52θ
47θ−62θ2 > 1. Since the numerator in qaa − qa
o
is negative for every α< 38−52θ




2.F o re v e r y{d,θ,α} ∈ R,
i) for θ<θ
−(d) the numerator in qaa−qa
o is negative and therefore qaa−qa
o > 0.




φ2(d,θ) is positive but smaller than 1. Therefore, for
α>
φ1(d,θ)
φ2(d,θ),t h en u m e r a t o ri nqaa − qa
o is negative and qaa − qa
o > 0.
The diﬀerence paa − pa
o follows exactly the opposite pattern.
34P r o o fo fL e m m a1.
The denominator in Ψa(d,θ,α)=
πa
p
2 −πna is positive for any {d,θ,α} ∈ R.T h e
numerator can be written as α2K1(d,θ)+αK2(d,θ)+K3(d,θ) where K1(d,θ) may be
either positive or negative. Solving K1(d,θ)=0for θ yields several solutions, from
which only one is relevant in R.D e n o t et h i sr o o tb ye θ(d) which is increasing in d.F o r
any {d,θ,α} ∈ R,i fθ>e θ(d), the function K1(d,θ) is positive and the numerator in
Ψa(d,θ,α) is a convex function in α. On the other hand, if θ<e θ(d), the function
K1(d,θ) is negative and the numerator in Ψa(d,θ,α) is a concave function in α.
Solving the numerator in Ψa(d,θ,α) for α results in α−(d,θ) and α+(d,θ).T h u s ,
there are two constraints on α to be met to have a positive numerator in Ψa(d,θ,α):
α/ ∈ (α−(d,θ),α +(d,θ)) if K1(d,θ) is positive; and α ∈ (α−(d,θ),α +(d,θ)) if K1(d,θ)
is negative.
• If K1(d,θ) is positive (θ>e θ(d)), the functions α−(d,θ) and α+(d,θ) are either
non real or yield an interval outside region R. Hence if α/ ∈ (α−(d,θ),α +(d,θ))
then the numerator in Ψa(d,θ,α) is positive and hence Ψa(d,θ,α) > 0.
One can check that d =0 .802 when e θ(d)=0 . Consequently, since e θ(d) is
increasing in d, d<0.802 is suﬃcient to ensure Ψa(d,θ,α) > 0.
• If K1(d,θ) is negative (θ<e θ(d)), it is unclear whether α belongsto(α−(d,θ),α +(d,θ)).
Nevertheless, one can check that Ψa(d,θ,α) is decreasing in α for d>0.849.
Therefore, we study Ψa(d,θ,α = α = B3) for d>0.849.S o l v i n gΨa(d,θ,α)=
0, we obtain a function b θ(d,α) that is increasing in d a sc a nb es e e ni nF i g u r e
7 below (since there is an upper bound for θ in region R , θ(d) ≡ L2 following
the notation in Appendix 1, we include it in the ﬁgure):
35Figure 7 Proof of Lemma 1
For θ>b θ(d,α), Ψa(d,θ,α) > 0 and then Ψa(d,θ,α) > 0 for any α in R.S i n c e
solving b θ(d,α)=θ(d) yields θ =0 .08,i ti ss u ﬃcient to require θ>0.08 to guarantee
Ψa(d,θ,α) > 0 for any {d,θ,α} ∈ R.
The value d =0 .856 is obtained by a numerical method when Ψa(d,θ,α = α =
B2) since for d>0.849 the function Ψa(d,θ,α) is decreasing in α. Hence, for
d>0.856, Ψa(d,θ,α = α) < 0 and then Ψa(d,θ,α) < 0 for any {d,θ,α} ∈ R.
P r o o fo fL e m m a2.
The ﬁrst part of the proof is similar to Lemma 1. As for the suﬃcient conditions,
for any {d,θ,α} ∈ R, one can check that Ψaa(d,θ,α)=πaa
2 − πa
o is increasing in
α for low values of d in the interval d ∈ (0.707,0.870] and decreasing in α for high
values of d in this interval. Solving Ψaa(d,θ,α = α)=0and Ψaa(d,θ,α = α)=0
yields two functions, b θ(d,α) and b θ(d,α) that are increasing in d as can be seen in
Figure 8 below.
36Figure ˙ 8: Proof of Lemma 2
Therefore for low values of d in the interval, θ>b θ(d,α) implies Ψaa(d,θ,α =
α) > 0 and hence Ψaa(d,θ,α) > 0 for any α in R.S o l v i n gb θ(d,α)=0we obtain the
value d =0 .707.H e n c e ,f o rd<0.707, θ>b θ(d,α),w eh a v et h a tΨaa(d,θ,α = α) > 0
and then Ψaa(d,θ,α) > 0.
I nh a p p e n st ob ec a s et h a tb θ(d,α)=b θ(d,α)=θ(d) at d =0 .828 and θ =0 .195
and Ψaa(d,θ,α)=0for any α in R. Therefore, for θ>0.195,b o t hb θ(d,α) andb θ(d,α)
are positive, then both Ψaa(d,θ,α = α) and Ψaa(d,θ,α = α) are also positive, and
hence Ψaa(d,θ,α) > 0. Similarly, for d>0.828 bothb θ(d,α) and b θ(d,α) are negative,
then both Ψaa(d,θ,α) and Ψaa(d,θ,α) are also negative, and hence Ψaa(d,θ,α) < 0.
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y1.
One can check that Ψpd(d,θ,α) is decreasing in α for any {d,θ,α} ∈ R.T h e r e f o r e
we study Ψpd(d,θ,α = α).S o l v i n g Ψpd(d,θ,α)=0 , we obtain a function e θ(d,α)
that is decreasing in d as can be seen in the ﬁgure below.
37Figure 9: Proof of Corollary 1
For θ<e θ(d,α), Ψpd(d,θ,α) < 0 and then Ψpd(d,θ,α) < 0 for any α in R.S i n c e
solving e θ(d,α)=0yields d =0 .355,i ti ss u ﬃcient to require d<0.355 to guarantee
Ψpd(d,θ,α) < 0 for any {d,θ,α} ∈ R.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 and Corollary 2.
For any market {d,θ =0 ,α} ∈ R, α>α (d) and d ∈ (0,1), where α(d)=B1 for
d<1
2 and α(d)=B3 for d>1
2.
1. We ﬁrst analyze Ψa(d,θ =0 ,α)=
πa
p
2 − πna and observe that:
(a) For d ∈ (0,0.8017], Ψa(d,θ =0 ,α) > 0.
(b) For d ∈ (0.8017,0.829], the sign of Ψa(d,θ =0 ,α) depends on the value
of α in the following way: Ψa(d,θ =0 ,α) > 0 for α<α 1(d),a n d








1. (a) For d ∈ (0.829,870], Ψa(d,θ =0 ,α) < 0.
2 .T h ea n a l y s i so fΨaa(d,θ =0 ,α)=πaa
2 − πa
o yields that,
(a) For d ∈ (0,0.707], Ψaa(d,θ =0 ,α) > 0.
(b) For d ∈ (0.707,0.7105], the sign of Ψaa(d,θ =0 ,α) depends on the value
of α in the following way: Ψaa(d,θ =0 ,α) > 0 for α/ ∈ (α2(d),α 3(d)),















1. (a) For d ∈ (0.7105,0.7249],t h es i g no fΨaa(d,θ =0 ,α) depends on the
value of α in the following way: Ψaa(d,θ =0 ,α) > 0 for α>α 3(d),a n d
Ψaa(d,θ =0 ,α) < 0 for α<α 3(d). For these values of d, we do not need
to consider α2(d) since α(d) >α 2(d) and α is always higher than α(d) in
R.
(b) For d ∈ (0.7249,0.870], Ψaa(d,θ =0 ,α) < 0.
2. Next we study the sign of Ψpd(d,θ =0 ,α)=πna − πaa
2 .
(a) For d ∈ (0,0.355], Ψpd(d,θ =0 ,α) < 0.
(b) For d ∈ (0.355,0.5], the sign of Ψpd(d,θ =0 ,α) depends on the value
of α in the following way: Ψpd(d,θ =0 ,α) > 0 for α>α 4(d),a n d







1. (a) For d ∈ (0.5,0.725], Ψpd(d,θ =0 ,α) > 0.
The combination of the above analysis characterizes the Nash equilibrium (NE)
in alliance formation:
1. (a) For d ∈ (0.829,0.870],t h eN Ei sno alliance because Ψa(d,θ,α) < 0.
(b) For d ∈ (0.817,0.829],w i t hα<α 1(d),t h eN Ei ssingle alliance because
Ψa(d,θ =0 ,α) > 0 and Ψaa(d,θ =0 ,α) < 0;a n dw i t hα>α 1(d),t h e
NE is no alliance because Ψa(d,θ =0 ,α) < 0.
(c) For d ∈ (0.7249,0.817],t h eN Ei ssingle alliance because Ψa(d,θ =
0,α) > 0 and Ψaa(d,θ =0 ,α) < 0.
(d) For d ∈ (0.7105,0.7249],w i t hα>α 3(d),t h eN Ei sdouble alliance be-
cause Ψa(d,θ =0 ,α) > 0 and Ψaa(d,θ =0 ,α) > 0;a n dw i t hα<α 3(d),
the NE is single alliance because Ψa(d,θ =0 ,α) > 0 and Ψaa(d,θ =
0,α) < 0.
39(e) For d ∈ (0.707,0.7105],w i t hα/ ∈ (α2(d),α 3(d)),t h eN Ei sdouble alliance
involving a prisoner’s dilemma because Ψa(d,θ =0 ,α) > 0, Ψaa(d,θ =
0,α) > 0 and Ψpd(d,θ =0 ,α) > 0;a n dw i t hα ∈ (α2(d),α 3(d)),t h eN E
is single alliance because Ψa(d,θ =0 ,α) > 0 and Ψaa(d,θ =0 ,α) < 0.
(f) For d ∈ (0.5,0.707],t h eN Ei sdouble alliance involving a prisoner’s
dilemma because Ψa(d,θ =0 ,α) > 0, Ψaa(d,θ =0 ,α) > 0 and Ψpd(d,θ =
0,α) > 0.
(g) For d ∈ (0.355,0.5],w i t hα<α 4(d) the NE is double alliance proﬁtable
per se because Ψa(d,θ =0 ,α) > 0, Ψaa(d,θ =0 ,α) > 0 and Ψpd(d,θ =
0,α) < 0;a n dw i t hα>α 4(d) the NE is double alliance involving a
prisoner’s dilemma because Ψa(d,θ =0 ,α) > 0, Ψaa(d,θ =0 ,α) > 0 and
Ψpd(d,θ =0 ,α) > 0.
(h) For d ∈ (0,0.355] the NE is double alliance proﬁtable per se because
Ψa(d,θ =0 ,α) > 0, Ψaa(d,θ =0 ,α) > 0 and Ψpd(d,θ =0 ,α) < 0.
40